Lend Lease Uniforms in the Great Patriotic War- Part 1

     I first became interested in the concept of Soviet clothing, made using imported materials, when I first got into Soviet living history. As I got further into researching cloth, and clothing, of the Red Army during the war, I realized that there was a lot of conjecture, theories, and hyperbole surrounding garments made using cloth obtained through the lend lease program.

    In my experience, I have seen “lend lease” as an easy button for explaining questionable living history practices. While at the same time, I have seen it “poo-poo’ed” as an insignificant source of material culture that was the realm of a officers, and a few elites. I really wanted to wrap my brain around it’s true impact, and how it can be incorporated, correctly, into the living history field.   

    My goal with this article is to understand the extent of Western war aid, with regard to clothing and textiles, during the Great Patriotic war. Was Western clothing aid a small drop in the bucket, compared to what Soviet industry was producing, or did it constitute a large amount of the clothing and footwear that was issued to the Red Army? What do the records and numbers tell us? Did we supply more cloth, or finished garments to the USSR? What about footwear? Is the concept of US or British issue boots being sent a reenactorism, or did it in fact occur?

     For this, I have leaned heavily on three primary sources, namely the supply protocols that outlined what the Western Powers were to give the Soviet Union, US War Department Records outlining everything given via lend lease, and the list kept by Major George Jordan. My hunt for additional records to compare is far from over, but I felt these gave enough of a starting point to begin clarifying some of these questions I had.

    The other objective of this work is to look at common characteristics of known wartime garments. This has been much more fun, than going through numbers on Lend Lease records, and was possible thanks to the contributions of collectors such as Phillippe Rio, and Kent Kiser. These gentlemen were extremely patient with my questions, and generous with their time (as they also supplied photos of specimens for study). Without them, the remaining two parts of this would not have been possible.

    This initially started six months ago, on a one-page outline, that was (upon later reflection) somewhat simplistic, and bowing to my own biases on the topic. As with so many things in my life, after much consultation with several mentors, I decided that this work could be much more than what I initially conceived. It has evolved into a three, possibly four-part article, which I’m hoping to complete sooner, rather than later.

    This is by no means an exhaustive study on the topic, and will no doubt be revised as more information becomes available, however, it’s my hope that this modest study on the topic will answer some of the lingering questions regarding this topic.

    This first part, is going to look strictly at numbers, and seeks to ascertain what did the USSR receive in terms of textiles, clothing, and footwear, and in what quantities. It seeks to analyze was inferences can be made from this aid that was sent, and what impact it may have had. Finally, it also looks at the time frame, in which it has been requested, and how that could factor into the equation.

    One final note, about this work: if anyone seeks to find clear cut, black and white, answers in my writing, they will find these are in short supply. It has been my experience that man seeks simplistic, dichotomous answers, to their questions of history. However, that same experiences teach me that much of the time those answers lay in a grey no-man lands, that frustrates us due to its ambiguity. This project has shown me that there are some clear cut answers, but many answers lay in that ambiguous no mans land, and must be prefaced with the dreaded words, “well, it depends.” 

                                                                                   

Protocol Numbers

    When deciding on researching this topic, one of the first questions I had to ask was “what clothing, yard goods, and notions did the US, and its allies, send to the Soviet Union, and in what quantities?” Fortunately, thanks to works focusing on more exciting topics, such as tanks, planes, and nuclear materials, some of the records containing these answers were readily available.   

    I began by looking at the supply protocols that were drafted between the United States, United Kingdom (and later Canada) and the Soviet Union. The protocols laid out what aid was requested, and what supplies and war materials were actually to be supplied to the Soviet Union.

     These were not blanket agreements, which were to run the duration of the war, nor were they blank checks for war and industrial support and supplies. Much like a football player, and his agent negotiating a contract extension, the nations met yearly to negotiate the amount of aid that would be sent for the coming year, and codifying this into a binding agreement.

     As the war dragged on, the protocols go from very basic, limited, contracts, to vast wide ranging shopping lists of war materials. While the focus of this article is on clothing, shoes, and textiles, the protocols show just how vast the aid given to the USSR was ranging from tanks and planes, to petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals.

    The first protocol signed by the US, UK, and USSR, covered  the time period of October 1, 1942 to June 30, 1942. This agreements specified that the following was to be furnished by the US and Great Britain:

1,500 tons of [shoe] sole leather

2,000 tons of wool (to be delivered monthly, and released by Great Britain)

400,000 pairs of Army boots

1,200,000 meters of Army cloth (the amounts, and sources, to be defined by the US and Britain)[1]

     As one can see, while the quantities are sizeable, the specificity is lacking. For example, one can infer from “meters of army cloth” that we’re talking about ready made textiles for making uniforms. However, is it wool, cotton, both? Is it made to Soviet weaving specifications, under contract, or is it surplus War Department/Ministry of Defense cloth?

     The same could be said for the boots. Are they surplus to the requirements of the US/UK, or are they made to Soviet specifications?

     The second protocol, which covered July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943, is similar to the first one, in its general specifications, but the quantities of goods needed for clothing and shoes is growing.  For example, the following items were to be furnished to the USSR:

                Item 71.- Sole Leather

                Amount Requested: 18,000 short tons

                No sole leather available except as included in finished shoes

                Item 72- Army Boots

                Amount requested: 4,800,000 pairs

                2,400,000 pairs of army shoes at a rate of 200,000 pair a month

                Item 73- Army Cloth

                Amount requested: 18,000,000 yards

                18,000,000 yards of army cloth at a monthly rate of 1,500,000 yards in ratio of 60 percent for

                overcoating and 40 percent for suiting[2]

     In addition to this, the protocol notes that, the United Kingdom was to supply the USSR with, “2000 tons per month, from New Zealand, dependent upon shipping conditions.”[3] It should be noted that it is does not specify whether this is finished wool cloth, wool yarn, or wool fiber. Given that the previous part of the protocol specifies cloth in terms of yardage, that this may be raw wool fiber, or wool yarn, which would be used to domestically manufacture cloth, however, this is purely conjecture.

     It appears that, as the Soviet Union mobilized her military (and her textile industry was working at capacity) that the need to import an increasing amount yard goods was needed. What’s also noticeable from this list is that the bulk of the yard goods requested, is wool for overcoats.

     The next protocol, covering the period of July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1944 shows the following items requested/sent:

                Sole leather

                                Requested: 20,160 tons

                                Offered: 18,000 tons

 

                Army boots

                                Requested: 3,600,000 pairs

                                Offered: 3,600,000 pairs

 

                Woolen cloth

                                Requested: 18,000,000 yards

                                Offered: 18,000,000 yards

 

                Cotton cloth

                                Requested: 25,000,000 yards

                                Offered: 25,000,000 yards[4]

     The appendix in this protocol, which lays out what the United Kingdom is to provide (in terms of cloth) specifies the following:

                Wool- 24,000 tons on a “scoured” basis from various sources.[5]

                (*Note- as with the previous protocol, this does not specify whether this is finished cloth, yarn for weaving cloth, or raw fiber.)

    As before, the need to import cloth, sole leather, and ready made boots has increased. In terms of yard goods requested the number of yards sent to the USSR jumps from 18,000,000 of mixed overcoat wool, and other cloth, to 18,000,000 yards in wool alone, and 25,000,000 yards of cotton. This is in the space of only one year.

     The last wartime protocol, which ran from July 1, 1944 to June 30, 1945, gives the following numbers- note, I’m including other, clothing related items here, as well, given the more detailed nature of this agreement:

V1-11B Woolen Cloth

Request: 21,662,000 yards

Offer: 20,712,000 yards

                10,000,000 yards overcoating- Army type

                7,050,000 yards suiting (*Authors note- this encompasses flannel, serge, and gabardine styles of cloth)

                1,364,000 yards Navy type- old orders

                2,000,000 yards Navy type- new orders

 

Leather

                Request: 22,000 tons- 18,000 tons sole leather

                                                   4,00 tons retanned upper leather

                Offer: 11,963 tons N.W.

12,322 tons S.W.

                                509 tons US sole leather

                                9,481 tons sole and innersole leather from South America

                                780 tons US upper leather

                                1,193 tons upper leather from South America

Army Boots

                Request: 5,000,000 pair

                Offer: 5,000,000 pair

Leather Jackets:

                Offer: 20,000[6]

This last order is really enlightening, particularly as how it relates to the garments studied for the second part of this work, in that the only cloth specified in the protocol is wool. Like an earlier protocol, overcoat wool seems to be the more sought after fabric. Moreover, this is the first order which differentiates between US Army materials, and US Navy materials that are sent.

 Another key takeaway is that the United Kingdom is no longer required to provide wool by the ton. There is no explanation for the reason why, but it would appear that the textile burden falls squarely on the US government at this point.

 There was one thing that puzzled me in all of this. The list contains large amounts of industrial aid sent to the USSR. This is everything from blast furnaces, machine tools, and equipment for powerplants. One thing that does not appear on any of the lists, until the last protocol, is textile making equipment.

 This protocol states that the Soviets requested $6,913,000 dollars worth of textile manufacturing equipment as part of the fourth protocol. The US government was willing to offer only $13,000 with additional aid “under study.”[7]

 Given the amount of cloth they were importing, it is interesting that they never took the time to ask for aid to expand their textile manufacturing base. I have no idea if this was because other war industry too priority, and this was an afterthought looking towards post-war recovery, or if there was another reason.

 Like the other previous protocols, this one shows large amounts of shoes, and shoe leather, being sent. While I’m sure these alone did not supplant Soviet domestic production, it shows that a significant amount of aid was requested in shodding the average Frontovik.

 We must view these records, before drawing concrete conclusions from them, in a certain context. They tell us that between October 1, 1942, and June 30, 1945, the US, and Great Britain, agreed to supply the USSR with 93,712,000 yards of fabric- a not insubstantial amount when take into account an average uniform of pilotka, tunic, and trousers use about 5 yards of cloth.

 We can infer that importing wool was a more pressing priority for the USSR. As will be covered in the next article, the vast majority of surviving garments are made from a woolen fabric, which also supports this hypothesis. However, when you have list with vague terms such as “army cloth,” trying to ascertain the ratio of wool to cotton uniforms is speculative at best.

 Another thing that the records tell us is, that, as the war went on, and more, and more, citizens were mobilized, the need for cloth to make garments increased.  The USSR then turned to the west to obtain the amounts they could not produce. This is evidenced by each protocol showing larger, and larger, amounts of cloth being requested/offered.

 Cloth imports peak with the 1943-1944 protocol (though 44-45 also has a sizable amount of yardage as well). Therefore, it is safe to infer that uniforms made with lend lease materials are more commonly found in the later part of the war.  

 These records are not the perfect oracle for getting unequivocal answers to the questions at hand. It is clear that imported materials did constitute a percentage of cloth used to make uniforms. However, we cannot say, without a comparable study of Soviet numbers, how large a percentage it was, or if it came close to parity with the yardage that Soviet mills were turning out.

 The numbers also do not tell us, with an overriding degree of specificity, what types of cloth were being sent, and by which nations, nor do the specify which cloth went to the Navy and which cloth went to Army. Furthermore, there is the very real possibility that some of the cloth was not military at all, but was instead ear marked for civilian clothing in war industry work.

 One last, but key point, which we sometimes overlook is this: how much of this cloth made it to the USSR? How many thousands of yards wound up at the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean off of Norway, in the hold of a sunk liberty ship? The yards dispatch is vast, and no doubt the yardage received was large, but what percentage was lost in transit?

 The protocols, while they answer some very general questions, still leave us with an incomplete picture. Therefore, it would be ill advised to draw far reaching conclusions from the raw numbers alone when deciding the extent to which lend lease materials were used, and when, by the average Soviet soldier.

Photo: US Army Quatermaster Corps Photos showing how a 2.5 ton truck was to be shipped via Lend Lease

                                              The War Department Files

 While the supply protocol gives something of a basic, overall picture, the US Army War Department records make for very illuminating reading. The files, entitled Lend-Lease Shipments- World War II is a detailed ledger of all US War Department material supplied to all countries who received lend lease aid.

 The quartermaster files are a treasure trove of detailed information, and specify whether an item is a US Army specification item, or one made to a foreign pattern. There is only one drawback to this record: it does not cover yard goods, buttons, or other raw materials for making garments, only completed items.

 During the course of the war, the following items, and quantities were sent to the Soviet Union:

Cap-Winter (wool or substitute) 2,950

Coats Cotton Quilted Half (*Author’s Note- Telogrieka?)- 5,000

Long w/Sheepskin Lining- 2,116

Mackinaw OD- 3000

Drawers, Cotton, Long- 1,002,824

Drawers, Wool, Long- 1,083,551

Gloves, Wool- 253,696

Jackets Russian Leather, Long (*Author’s Note- Flight Jackets?)- 110,556

Short Leather Goatskin (*Author’s Note- Flight Jackets?)- 600

Jumpers, various- 298, 503

Overcoats- 131

Socks 50/50 wool & cotton- 84,583

Suit, Arctic, Alpaca Lined OD- 400,092

Trouser quilted (Author’s Note- Telogrieka?)- 5,000

Dungarees- 300,250

Undershirt Summer Sleeveless- 5,000

Undershirts Long Sleeves- 994,513

Vests, Women’s Winter (or WAAC)- 6,000

Windbreakers- 38,021

Belts, Leather, 2in- 2,677,658

Blankets- Wool OD, M-1934- 1,541,590

Boots Upper Retanned- 41,833

Shoes Black CCC- 32,143

Service EM- 991,472

Service Low, Women’s- 99,669

Service Russian Last- 13,470,936[8]

        To me, the numbers for ready made garments is not nearly as spectacular as the vast yardage of cloth we supplied. Most of the garments sent are undergarments, and small clothes (such as knit caps, sweaters, and gloves). No completed uniforms, made to Soviet patterns were sent (as opposed to the War-Aid Battledress that was furnished to the British), nor were large quantities of US garments dispatched.

        Going solely off this list, it would appear that the use of US M-1937 wool trousers for Soviet is something that I suspected for a long time- a reenactorism. Per the shipping lists, no completed sets of trousers were sent via official channels. That is not to say that a Soviet soldier, working near the Tehran corridor, could not have traded a US serviceman for a pair, but it would have been the extreme exception.

        That being said, this list sheds light into another argument I’ve seen debated many a time: the use of US boots. Based on this list, it would appear that we sent the Soviets 991,472 US Army service shoes. On top of this, 32,143 Civilian Conservation Corps shoes, 99,669 US Army women’s service shoes, and 41,833 pairs of boots with re-tanned uppers were also provided from, presumably, US War Department Quartermaster Stores. While this pales in comparison with the 13,470,936 pairs of Russian pattern boots that were made here, and sent over, it is still a sizeable quantity.

        One of the pieces that I really found interesting on this list was the amount of blankets being sent over. Over 1.5 million US Army, mustard wool, M-37 blankets found their way to the Soviet Union. How many got there, and where they were ultimately distributed is anyone one’s guess, but it also supports the idea that the Soviets had a hard time producing enough heavy, woolen, cloth with their own mills.

        Ultimately, when you put both the protocol, and the war department lists, together, one begins to have a little bit better picture of nature of the aid in which we sent. From my perspective, the big take-away is that the Soviet Union had the manufacturing capability to turn out garments sufficient to meet its needs. However, in order to do this, they needed to rely on a substantial amount of imported textiles.

                                                     

                                                         The Major George Jordan List

        I had some conflicted feelings about using this list, not because I feel that it is inherently inaccurate, but because of the agenda behind it. To make a long story short, George Jordan was a US Army Officer charged with administering the delivery of war-aid to the USSR. He became concerned with the amount, and nature, of the items being sent to the Soviets, he even went so far as to open sealed diplomatic pouches to discover what was being sent.

        Eventually, Major Jordan kept several ledgers detailing every item sent over during his administration of the program. There’s some ambiguity as to when he began keeping records, and if he went back and covered prior shipments. Given this, I do not believe these to be even close to accurate accounting of what was sent over.

        After the war, he became something of a darling to the anti-communist right. In 1949 he testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee about nuclear secrets and supplies sent to the Soviets. All of this was later included, and detailed, in a book he self-published in the 1950s entitled From Major Jordan’s Diary.[9] 

        Jordan’s ledgers are a somewhat detailed accounting of the yard goods sent to the USSR. In addition, it includes other critical textile supplies. However, as I mentioned earlier, I don’t believe it’s anywhere close to a full accounting, and the political motivation behind makes me somewhat critical as to its veracity. However, taken on face value, I do believe that it gives yet another insight into the topic at hand.

        According to Jordan, the following items were dispatched to the Soviet Union while he was a Lend Lease Officer.

Mohair cloth- 1,572, 382 lbs

Vicose & cupr cent fil yarn- 40,126 lbs

Acetate rayon yarn- 292,272 lbs

Spun rayon yarn- 84,071 lbs

Wool cloth & dress goods- 95,384,022 lbs

Wool blankets- 5,242,637 lbs

Wool knit apparel- 203 lbs

Wool men’s overcoats, suits, and pants- 188,611 pants

Cotton Blankets- 231,905

Cotton fabric, napped, excl. flannel- 277,218 sq yards

Cotton denims- 8,536,926 sq yard

Cotton drill, twill, etc- 70, 290, 453

Cotton underwear, men’s- 101,302 dozen

Cotton flannels, blch, or colored- 4,504,083 square yards

Cotton men’s jackets and wind breakers- 18,017

Cotton cloth (grey)- 289,688 sq yard

Cotton men’s work clothing- 61,247 doz

Cotton men’s clothing of woven fabrics- 8,887 doz

Cotton sewing threads- 3,282,633 lbs

Cotton carded yarn (gray)-165, 389 lbs

Cotton print cloth- 1,670,468 sq yards

Cut card yarn blch & col- 77,228 lbs

Cotton Table Damask- 111,470 sq yards

Cotton sweaters- 1,500

Cotton print color yarn fabric- 737,219 sq yard

Cotton pile fabrics- 500 sq yards

Cotton knit fabrics- 573,757 lbs

Boots and shoes (Mens) 5,396,651 pair

Shoes Infant- 45,373 pair

Boots and shoes (youth)- 150,297 pair

Footwear, leather sole & upper- 1,356,395 pair

Leather calf and kid- 5,281,631 sq feet

Leather upper n e s- 21,272,175 sq feet

Leather for soles- 51,918,361 lbs

Sole leather, bends, and backsides- 16,848,339 lbs[10]

        Setting aside Jordan’s Modis Operandi, I think the list confirms what the protocols tell us, and support the idea that the Soviet garment industry could turn out its own clothing, albeit with cloth obtained from overseas. The 95 million pounds of wool cloth, also supports my argument that producing enough wool, was something that the Soviet textile industry struggled with.

        The list also tells us things that we did not know about, from either the supply protocols, and the War Department records. For example, the amount of yarns being sent (particularly synthetics like vicose and rayon) indicates that Soviet mills were even able to weave a their own cloth provided they had the raw materials to do so.

        Jordan’s ledgers are consistent with the protocols, and War Department, records that show the Soviets also struggled to make enough footwear to shod their population. While one can argue about the final destination of lend lease footwear (and how much of it went to the front), I think the numbers do support the idea that they Soviets could not keep up with the demand for footwear in wartime.

        Where I think Jordan’s list falls short, and where his agenda muddies the water, is that it does not differentiate between what was raised and sent via private channels (such as through the Russian War Relief organization), and what was sent as a result of lend lease agreements. His argument is essentially, “the Reds robbed us blind, we gave them the bomb, and this list proves just how bad we were scammed.”

        What he does not take into account is that much of the “civilian luxuries listed” presumably came not through back room deals between closeted communists in the Roosevelt administration, but were sent via private relief organizations.  It is because this is all lumped into his “lend lease” ledger, that many times it is hard to ascertain what would have been sent to the front for war use, and what would have been sent to make civilian goods/impressed for civilian use.

What’s Next?

         This is generally the point where I would summarize my argument, and the conclusions, of my research. However, this gives just the stale numbers and data, of my research. The extent garments, that I have had the privilege of examining, tell a crucial part of the story, and help us analyze the topic from another lens, that I will save my closing arguments for the end of the third article.

        However, I will close with a brief encapsulation of what I believe the evidence tells us to this point. Soviet garment production was able to keep pace with the ever growing numbers of uniforms that needed to be made. However, the USSR struggled to produce enough cloth, particularly woolens, to keep up with the demand. As such, by 1943-1944, they are forced to import vast amounts of foreign yard goods to make up the demand. The large amounts of cloth brought into the country does not support the notion that (as far as 1944-1945 is concerned) lend lease material was used for officers and a privileged elites.

        The same cannot be said for the Soviet shoe industry. Not only are they importing vast quantities of leather for making shoes, they imported around fourteen million pair of ready made boots. While the vast majority are made to Soviet specifications, there is still a sizeable amount of surplus US War Department footwear sent as well.

         This is about where I will have to leave this, until I am able to post parts two and three. Until then, I hope you enjoyed this.

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[1] Department of State. Soviet Supply Protocols, 2759, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948

[2] Department of State. Soviet Supply Protocols, 2759, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948

[3] Department of State. Soviet Supply Protocols, 2759, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948

[4] Department of State. Soviet Supply Protocols, 2759, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948

[5] Department of State. Soviet Supply Protocols, 2759, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948

[6] Department of State. Soviet Supply Protocols, 2759, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948

[7] Department of State. Soviet Supply Protocols, 2759, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948

[8] War Department, Lend Lease Shipments WWII, No Publication Number, Washington D.C.: War Department, 1946

[9] George Jordan, From Major Jordan’s Diaries (New York: The Bookmailer Inc, 1952) 3

[10] George Jordan, From Major Jordan’s Diaries (New York: The Bookmailer Inc, 1952) 154-175