Lend Lease Uniforms in the Great
Patriotic War- Part 1
In my experience, I have seen “lend lease” as an easy button for explaining questionable living history practices. While at the same time, I have seen it “poo-poo’ed” as an insignificant source of material culture that was the realm of a officers, and a few elites. I really wanted to wrap my brain around it’s true impact, and how it can be incorporated, correctly, into the living history field.
My goal with this article is to understand the extent of Western war aid, with regard to clothing and textiles, during the Great Patriotic war. Was Western clothing aid a small drop in the bucket, compared to what Soviet industry was producing, or did it constitute a large amount of the clothing and footwear that was issued to the Red Army? What do the records and numbers tell us? Did we supply more cloth, or finished garments to the USSR? What about footwear? Is the concept of US or British issue boots being sent a reenactorism, or did it in fact occur?
For this, I have leaned heavily on three primary sources, namely the supply protocols that outlined what the Western Powers were to give the Soviet Union, US War Department Records outlining everything given via lend lease, and the list kept by Major George Jordan. My hunt for additional records to compare is far from over, but I felt these gave enough of a starting point to begin clarifying some of these questions I had.
The other objective of this work is to look at common characteristics of known wartime garments. This has been much more fun, than going through numbers on Lend Lease records, and was possible thanks to the contributions of collectors such as Phillippe Rio, and Kent Kiser. These gentlemen were extremely patient with my questions, and generous with their time (as they also supplied photos of specimens for study). Without them, the remaining two parts of this would not have been possible.
This initially started six months ago, on a one-page outline, that was (upon later reflection) somewhat simplistic, and bowing to my own biases on the topic. As with so many things in my life, after much consultation with several mentors, I decided that this work could be much more than what I initially conceived. It has evolved into a three, possibly four-part article, which I’m hoping to complete sooner, rather than later.
This is by no means an
exhaustive study on the topic, and will no doubt be revised as more information
becomes available, however, it’s my hope that this modest study on the topic
will answer some of the lingering questions regarding this topic.
This first part, is going
to look strictly at numbers, and seeks to ascertain what did the USSR receive
in terms of textiles, clothing, and footwear, and in what quantities. It seeks
to analyze was inferences can be made from this aid that was sent, and what
impact it may have had. Finally, it also looks at the time frame, in which it
has been requested, and how that could factor into the equation.
One final note, about this work: if anyone seeks to find clear cut, black and white, answers in my writing, they will find these are in short supply. It has been my experience that man seeks simplistic, dichotomous answers, to their questions of history. However, that same experiences teach me that much of the time those answers lay in a grey no-man lands, that frustrates us due to its ambiguity. This project has shown me that there are some clear cut answers, but many answers lay in that ambiguous no mans land, and must be prefaced with the dreaded words, “well, it depends.”
Protocol Numbers
When
deciding on researching this topic, one of the first questions I had to ask was
“what clothing, yard goods, and notions did the US, and its allies, send to the
Soviet Union, and in what quantities?” Fortunately, thanks to works focusing on
more exciting topics, such as tanks, planes, and nuclear materials, some of the
records containing these answers were readily available.
I began by looking at the supply protocols that were drafted between the United States, United Kingdom (and later Canada) and the Soviet Union. The protocols laid out what aid was requested, and what supplies and war materials were actually to be supplied to the Soviet Union.
The first protocol signed by the US, UK, and USSR, covered the time period of October 1, 1942 to June 30, 1942. This agreements specified that the following was to be furnished by the US and Great Britain:
1,500 tons of [shoe] sole
leather
2,000 tons of wool (to be
delivered monthly, and released by Great Britain)
400,000 pairs of Army boots
1,200,000 meters of Army cloth
(the amounts, and sources, to be defined by the US and Britain)[1]
Item 71.- Sole Leather
Amount
Requested: 18,000 short tons
No sole leather available except as included in finished shoes
Item
72- Army Boots
Amount
requested: 4,800,000 pairs
2,400,000 pairs of army shoes at a rate of 200,000 pair a month
Item
73- Army Cloth
Amount
requested: 18,000,000 yards
18,000,000
yards of army cloth at a monthly rate of 1,500,000 yards in ratio of 60 percent
for
overcoating
and 40 percent for suiting[2]
Sole
leather
Requested:
20,160 tons
Offered:
18,000 tons
Army
boots
Requested:
3,600,000 pairs
Offered:
3,600,000 pairs
Woolen
cloth
Requested:
18,000,000 yards
Offered:
18,000,000 yards
Cotton
cloth
Requested:
25,000,000 yards
Offered:
25,000,000 yards[4]
Wool-
24,000 tons on a “scoured” basis from various sources.[5]
(*Note-
as with the previous protocol, this does not specify whether this is finished
cloth, yarn for weaving cloth, or raw fiber.)
As before, the need to import cloth, sole leather, and ready made boots has increased. In terms of yard goods requested the number of yards sent to the USSR jumps from 18,000,000 of mixed overcoat wool, and other cloth, to 18,000,000 yards in wool alone, and 25,000,000 yards of cotton. This is in the space of only one year.
V1-11B Woolen Cloth
Request: 21,662,000 yards
Offer: 20,712,000 yards
10,000,000
yards overcoating- Army type
7,050,000
yards suiting (*Authors note- this encompasses flannel, serge, and gabardine
styles of cloth)
1,364,000
yards Navy type- old orders
2,000,000
yards Navy type- new orders
Leather
Request:
22,000 tons- 18,000 tons sole leather
4,00 tons retanned upper leather
Offer:
11,963 tons N.W.
12,322 tons
S.W.
509
tons US sole leather
9,481
tons sole and innersole leather from South America
780
tons US upper leather
1,193 tons upper leather from South America
Army Boots
Request:
5,000,000 pair
Offer: 5,000,000 pair
Leather Jackets:
Offer: 20,000[6]
This last order is really enlightening, particularly as how it relates to the garments studied for the second part of this work, in that the only cloth specified in the protocol is wool. Like an earlier protocol, overcoat wool seems to be the more sought after fabric. Moreover, this is the first order which differentiates between US Army materials, and US Navy materials that are sent.
The War Department Files
During the course of the war, the following items, and quantities were sent to the Soviet Union:
Cap-Winter (wool or substitute) 2,950
Coats Cotton Quilted Half (*Author’s Note- Telogrieka?)-
5,000
Long w/Sheepskin Lining- 2,116
Mackinaw OD- 3000
Drawers, Cotton, Long- 1,002,824
Drawers, Wool, Long- 1,083,551
Gloves, Wool- 253,696
Jackets Russian Leather, Long (*Author’s Note- Flight
Jackets?)- 110,556
Short Leather Goatskin (*Author’s Note- Flight Jackets?)-
600
Jumpers, various- 298, 503
Overcoats- 131
Socks 50/50 wool & cotton- 84,583
Suit, Arctic, Alpaca Lined OD- 400,092
Trouser quilted (Author’s Note- Telogrieka?)- 5,000
Dungarees- 300,250
Undershirt Summer Sleeveless- 5,000
Undershirts Long Sleeves- 994,513
Vests, Women’s Winter (or WAAC)- 6,000
Windbreakers- 38,021
Belts, Leather, 2in- 2,677,658
Blankets- Wool OD, M-1934- 1,541,590
Boots Upper Retanned- 41,833
Shoes Black CCC- 32,143
Service EM- 991,472
Service Low, Women’s- 99,669
Service Russian Last- 13,470,936[8]
To me, the numbers for ready made garments is not nearly as spectacular as the vast yardage of cloth we supplied. Most of the garments sent are undergarments, and small clothes (such as knit caps, sweaters, and gloves). No completed uniforms, made to Soviet patterns were sent (as opposed to the War-Aid Battledress that was furnished to the British), nor were large quantities of US garments dispatched.
Going solely off this list, it would appear that the use of US M-1937 wool trousers for Soviet is something that I suspected for a long time- a reenactorism. Per the shipping lists, no completed sets of trousers were sent via official channels. That is not to say that a Soviet soldier, working near the Tehran corridor, could not have traded a US serviceman for a pair, but it would have been the extreme exception.
That being said, this list sheds light into another argument I’ve seen debated many a time: the use of US boots. Based on this list, it would appear that we sent the Soviets 991,472 US Army service shoes. On top of this, 32,143 Civilian Conservation Corps shoes, 99,669 US Army women’s service shoes, and 41,833 pairs of boots with re-tanned uppers were also provided from, presumably, US War Department Quartermaster Stores. While this pales in comparison with the 13,470,936 pairs of Russian pattern boots that were made here, and sent over, it is still a sizeable quantity.
One of the pieces that I really found interesting on this list was the amount of blankets being sent over. Over 1.5 million US Army, mustard wool, M-37 blankets found their way to the Soviet Union. How many got there, and where they were ultimately distributed is anyone one’s guess, but it also supports the idea that the Soviets had a hard time producing enough heavy, woolen, cloth with their own mills.
Ultimately, when you put both the protocol, and the war department lists, together, one begins to have a little bit better picture of nature of the aid in which we sent. From my perspective, the big take-away is that the Soviet Union had the manufacturing capability to turn out garments sufficient to meet its needs. However, in order to do this, they needed to rely on a substantial amount of imported textiles.
The Major George Jordan List
I had some conflicted feelings about using this list, not because I feel that it is inherently inaccurate, but because of the agenda behind it. To make a long story short, George Jordan was a US Army Officer charged with administering the delivery of war-aid to the USSR. He became concerned with the amount, and nature, of the items being sent to the Soviets, he even went so far as to open sealed diplomatic pouches to discover what was being sent.
Eventually, Major Jordan kept several ledgers detailing every item sent over during his administration of the program. There’s some ambiguity as to when he began keeping records, and if he went back and covered prior shipments. Given this, I do not believe these to be even close to accurate accounting of what was sent over.
After the war, he became something of a darling to the anti-communist right. In 1949 he testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee about nuclear secrets and supplies sent to the Soviets. All of this was later included, and detailed, in a book he self-published in the 1950s entitled From Major Jordan’s Diary.[9]
Jordan’s ledgers are a somewhat detailed accounting of the yard goods sent to the USSR. In addition, it includes other critical textile supplies. However, as I mentioned earlier, I don’t believe it’s anywhere close to a full accounting, and the political motivation behind makes me somewhat critical as to its veracity. However, taken on face value, I do believe that it gives yet another insight into the topic at hand.
According to Jordan, the following items were dispatched to the Soviet Union while he was a Lend Lease Officer.
Mohair cloth- 1,572, 382 lbs
Vicose & cupr cent fil yarn- 40,126 lbs
Acetate rayon yarn- 292,272 lbs
Spun rayon yarn- 84,071 lbs
Wool cloth & dress goods- 95,384,022 lbs
Wool blankets- 5,242,637 lbs
Wool knit apparel- 203 lbs
Wool men’s overcoats, suits, and pants- 188,611 pants
Cotton Blankets- 231,905
Cotton fabric, napped, excl. flannel- 277,218 sq yards
Cotton denims- 8,536,926 sq yard
Cotton drill, twill, etc- 70, 290, 453
Cotton underwear, men’s- 101,302 dozen
Cotton flannels, blch, or colored- 4,504,083 square yards
Cotton men’s jackets and wind breakers- 18,017
Cotton cloth (grey)- 289,688 sq yard
Cotton men’s work clothing- 61,247 doz
Cotton men’s clothing of woven fabrics- 8,887 doz
Cotton sewing threads- 3,282,633 lbs
Cotton carded yarn (gray)-165, 389 lbs
Cotton print cloth- 1,670,468 sq yards
Cut card yarn blch & col- 77,228 lbs
Cotton Table Damask- 111,470 sq yards
Cotton sweaters- 1,500
Cotton print color yarn fabric- 737,219 sq yard
Cotton pile fabrics- 500 sq yards
Cotton knit fabrics- 573,757 lbs
Boots and shoes (Mens) 5,396,651 pair
Shoes Infant- 45,373 pair
Boots and shoes (youth)- 150,297 pair
Footwear, leather sole & upper- 1,356,395 pair
Leather calf and kid- 5,281,631 sq feet
Leather upper n e s- 21,272,175 sq feet
Leather for soles- 51,918,361 lbs
Sole leather, bends, and backsides- 16,848,339 lbs[10]
Setting aside Jordan’s Modis Operandi, I think the list confirms what the protocols tell us, and support the idea that the Soviet garment industry could turn out its own clothing, albeit with cloth obtained from overseas. The 95 million pounds of wool cloth, also supports my argument that producing enough wool, was something that the Soviet textile industry struggled with.
The list also tells us things that we did not know about, from either the supply protocols, and the War Department records. For example, the amount of yarns being sent (particularly synthetics like vicose and rayon) indicates that Soviet mills were even able to weave a their own cloth provided they had the raw materials to do so.
Jordan’s ledgers are consistent with the protocols, and War Department, records that show the Soviets also struggled to make enough footwear to shod their population. While one can argue about the final destination of lend lease footwear (and how much of it went to the front), I think the numbers do support the idea that they Soviets could not keep up with the demand for footwear in wartime.
Where I think Jordan’s list falls short, and where his agenda muddies the water, is that it does not differentiate between what was raised and sent via private channels (such as through the Russian War Relief organization), and what was sent as a result of lend lease agreements. His argument is essentially, “the Reds robbed us blind, we gave them the bomb, and this list proves just how bad we were scammed.”
What he does not take into account is that much of the “civilian luxuries listed” presumably came not through back room deals between closeted communists in the Roosevelt administration, but were sent via private relief organizations. It is because this is all lumped into his “lend lease” ledger, that many times it is hard to ascertain what would have been sent to the front for war use, and what would have been sent to make civilian goods/impressed for civilian use.
What’s Next?
However, I will close with a brief encapsulation of what I believe the evidence tells us to this point. Soviet garment production was able to keep pace with the ever growing numbers of uniforms that needed to be made. However, the USSR struggled to produce enough cloth, particularly woolens, to keep up with the demand. As such, by 1943-1944, they are forced to import vast amounts of foreign yard goods to make up the demand. The large amounts of cloth brought into the country does not support the notion that (as far as 1944-1945 is concerned) lend lease material was used for officers and a privileged elites.
The same cannot be said for the Soviet shoe industry. Not only are they importing vast quantities of leather for making shoes, they imported around fourteen million pair of ready made boots. While the vast majority are made to Soviet specifications, there is still a sizeable amount of surplus US War Department footwear sent as well.
[1] Department
of State. Soviet Supply Protocols,
2759, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948
[2]
Department of State. Soviet Supply
Protocols, 2759, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948
[3]
Department of State. Soviet Supply
Protocols, 2759, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948
[4]
Department of State. Soviet Supply
Protocols, 2759, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948
[5]
Department of State. Soviet Supply
Protocols, 2759, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948
[6]
Department of State. Soviet Supply
Protocols, 2759, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948
[7]
Department of State. Soviet Supply
Protocols, 2759, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948
[8]
War Department, Lend Lease Shipments WWII,
No Publication Number, Washington D.C.: War Department, 1946
[9] George
Jordan, From Major Jordan’s Diaries
(New York: The Bookmailer Inc, 1952) 3
[10] George
Jordan, From Major Jordan’s Diaries
(New York: The Bookmailer Inc, 1952) 154-175